This paper deals with two questions. The first question is which of the many rates that have been proposed for measuring the safety of certain vehicle types of driver groups is to be trusted. We conclude that for a rate to be correct, the numerator and the denominator must pertain to the same entity. If vehicle exposure is in the denominator, then the count of vehicles of some type in accidents (and not of accidents involving vehicles of some type) must be in the numerator; if driver exposure is in the denominator then the count of drivers of some kind in accidents (not of accidents involving that kind of driver) must be in the numerator. The second question is what meaning can be attributed to a finding of over-representation. We conclude that because we always use reported accidents of specified severity, over-representation may be caused by a mix of three factors: the probability to be in an accident per unit of exposure, the probability of the accidents to be reported, and the probability of the accident to be of the specified severity. It follows, that an indication of over-representation cannot be taken to mean that the entity has a larger than normal chance to be involved in accidents nor that one should seek remedies that reduce that chance of the entity to be involved in accidents.
INTRODUCTION
There is a rich research literature comparing the safety of various vehicle types and driver groups.
The accumulated knowledge serves to make informed decisions about a variety of practical issues.
A common question is whether a certain vehicles of a specified vehicle type (or vehicles having certain traits), or drivers of a certain group (drivers with specified characteristics) are less safe than others. To answer the question, the extant research results are reviewed so as to establish what
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appears to be the current state of knowledge. In such reviews diverse and sometimes contradictory results are found. The onus is on the reviewer to separate the wheat from the chaff. Bowman and Hummer (1) found themselves in this situation when reviewing the literature about truck accidents on urban freeways. I was facing this predicament recently, when preparing a review for a study on truck size and weight regulation. To do it right I had to clarify to myself what which results are right and which are wrong.
CORRECT AND INCORRECT DEFINITIONS OF ACCIDENT RATE
Accident rate is habitually defined as the ratio of accidents and exposure. Traditionally it has been used to describe the safety of a road or the risk to people using it. The same definition of accident rate is at times used to compare the risk of various vehicle types or driver groups. In this case a commonly used definition is:
Bowman and Hummer (1) point to a pitfall in the accident rate computation for trucks when it is calculated by equation 1.
In their numerical example, trucks have 20% and cars 80% of the total exposure. If it is assumed that cars and trucks are equally likely to be involved in an accident per unit of exposure (the 'equiprobability assumption'), they should have equal accident rates. Bowman The root of the problem with equation 1 is that the numerator pertains to apples and the denominator to oranges. Since the denominator is the exposure of vehicles, the numerator should also be the count of vehicles, not the count of accidents. To illustrate, under the equiprobability and independence assumptions, and with the 20%-80% share of exposure, in 100 two-vehicle accidents we expect the following counts: their share of exposure. It follows that in two-vehicle accidents it is the (Number of vehicles of a specified type involved in two-vehicle accidents)/(2×Number of two-vehicle accidents) that should correspond to the proportion of exposure by the vehicles of the specified type.
The same logic applies to 3, 4, 5,. . .,n-vehicle accidents. To show this generally, let E and T E denote truck and car exposures. Define the share of truck exposure by:
C Now 1-P is the share of car of exposure. When trucks and cars are equally likely to be involved in an accident, P is also the probability that a vehicle in a multivehicle accident is a truck. Let N be n the number accidents involving n vehicles . Under the statistical independence assumption, the probability to have 'i' trucks amongst the 'n' vehicles in an accident is given by the binomial probability mass functioni p P (1-P) . The expectation of the binomial distribution is nP. Thus the n i i n -i number of trucks expected to be involved in N accidents of n vehicles is nPN . By the same n n argument the number of cars expected to be involved in N accidents of n vehicles is n(1-P)N . It n n follows that in accidents involving n vehicles the expression (Number of vehicles of a specified type involved in n-vehicle accidents)/(n×Number of n-vehicle accidents) is nPN /(nN )=P for trucks and n n n(1-P)N /(nN )=1-P for cars, as required.
n n A part of the Bowman and Hummer (1) paper is based on the earlier work by Khasnabis and Reddy (2) To check whether equation 3 will pass muster when the assumption of independence is relaxed a simulation program has been written. It allows one to specify a variety of traffic conditions which vary from an entirely random mix of trucks and cars to where trucks tend to follow trucks and cars tend to follow cars. With the exposures of 20% trucks and 80% cars we examined the simulated ratio of cars-in-accidents/trucks-in-accidents. The specified conditions ranged from when trucks tend to follow trucks with a probability of 0.2 (which is equivalent to a random mix) up to a probability of 0.99 (when trucks will almost always collide with trucks and cars with cars). In all cases the simulated ratio was within one percent of the ratio of exposures. While simulation results cannot prove the general verity of an assertion, they provide reasonable assurance that equation 3 gives unbiassed estimates even when the independence assumption does not hold.
By the equiprobability assumption cars and trucks have the same probability to be in an accident per unit of exposure. Suppose now that this assumption is untrue. This can be represented by a factor 'F' multiplying the exposure of trucks. Thus, if trucks were F times as likely to be in an accident as cars it would be as if their exposure was not E but F×E while the equiprobability 
THE 'WHY-INDETERMINACY'.
Clarke ( The data we have are always of reported accidents. The question is whether, when trucks and cars are equally likely to be involved in accidents per unit of exposure, the expected equality p=P will still hold even if analysis is based on reported accidents of a specified severity. The answer to this question is:"No". That is, even if truck and cars are equally likely to be involved in an accident per unit of travel, their proportion in reported accidents of specified severity will not be the same. To show this, assume again that the identical A and B-vehicles differ in exposure but do not differ in time or place of travel, nor in the kind of driver. However, assume now that the accidents in which the A and B-vehicles are involved differ in the probability to be reported as belonging to some accident severity class. This may be due to differences between A and B vehicles in the inclination to report accidents and also due to differences in the severity of the outcome of the accidents in which these vehicles are involved. 
Let Q and Q be the probabilities for an A and a B one-vehicle accident to be reported in a A B certain accident severity class. Of N one-vehicle accidents occurring we expect to find in the one should expect that pCP. This is not because of a difference between A and B vehicles in their risk to be in a (single-vehicle) accident; it is entirely due to the difference in the probability of A and B vehicle accidents (once an accident has occurred) to be reported in this severity class.
The same can be generalized to two-vehicle accidents. Let Q , Q and Q be the AA BB AB corresponding probabilities of an accident to be reported in a certain severity class for two-vehicle accidents. Of the N P accidents involving two A-vehicles we expect N P Q accidents to be in the knowledge of p says nothing about the propensity of medium/heavy vehicles to be in accidents.
If medium/heavy trucks offer more protection against a fatality than lighter vehicles then Q /Q >1. One often encounters statements about entities of some kind being 'over-involved' in accidents. That is, that they are found in more accidents than is expected in light of their exposure.
We have shown here is that over-representation and under-representation can occur even when the entities under scrutiny have the same probability of accident per unit exposure as any other entity.
This comes about because accident frequency, the chance of an accident being reported, and accident severity, are all tied together in the measure of over-representation 'p'. Without knowing the Qratios (Q /Q , Q /Q . . . .) one cannot know whether some noted over-representation is due to an A B AB AA increased probability to be involved in an accident per unit of exposure, or due to a difference in accident reporting, whether it is due to difference in accident severity, or perhaps any mixture of these three factors. This elementary 'why-indeterminacy' cannot be resolved except by obtaining independent estimates of the Q-ratios.
It matters whether over-representation is due to elevated probability of accident per unit exposure, due to larger likelihood of an accident to be reported, or due to a larger chance of an accident to be of a certain severity class. It matters to those who use over-representation as a good reason for intervention. The existence of the 'why-indeterminacy' counsels caution. Thus, e.g., i f older drivers are over-involved mainly because their bones are brittle, because they are more likely to die as a result of trauma, or because they are more inclined to report accidents, one should not seek reasons for their over-representation in declining cognitive skill, vision deficiencies or bad driving habits. In the same vein, should heavy trucks be found over-involved in severe accidents mainly due to their mass, one should not begin by seeking reasons or remedies in their stability, their brakes or the condition of truck drivers. Similarly, one may not attribute difference in the safety of roads solely to their geometric features if the roads also differ in the speed of travel (since speed affects severity).
Some argue (as one of the referees did) that no matter why an entity is over-involved, the fact that is over-involved is reason enough to initiate a search for remedies. By this argument, even if trucks are over-involved due to their mass and older drivers due to the brittleness of their bones, it is still sensible to attempt to "enhance the crash avoidance capabilities of trucks . . . and improve the cognitive skills of truck and older drivers. . .". In my opinion, whether an attempt to enhance safety is or is not sensible depends largely on the expected cost of the attempt and on its expected payoff.
The mere existence of over-representation without the knowledge of its cause can tell us nothing about either expected cost or its payoff. There is no logical reason to expect nor empirical evidence to suggest that indications of over-representation are associated with higher than average costeffectiveness for measures aimed at reducing the chance of involvement in an accident.
In a research note C.D. Kemp (4) speaks of "An elementary ambiguity in accident theory".
It deals with a similar subject matter -partial ascertainment. Partial ascertainment arises when data censoring occurs so that not all events that occur are recorded. Kemp asks whether from data about recorded events it is possible say something about (the distribution) of events occurring. He concludes one cannot used recorded counts to separate the rate at which events are occurring from the process that censors it. In our case we have not only partial ascertainment but also differences in severity that influence the severity category into which a reported event is placed . This results in the "why-indeterminacy". One cannot say whether over-representation is due to elevated frequency of accidents, an above-average inclination to report an accident, or a higher severity-given-accident.
We argue that only when one can claim that all Q ratios are equal is it possible to give useful interpretations to p. In all other cases one has to know the Q-ratios before p can be usefully interpreted.
The message is not original. Evans (5) showed that the when the susceptibility to die as a result of an accident is taken into account, the fatality rate for older drivers are dramatically lowered and become similar to the rate for middle age drivers. Hakamies-Blomquist ( 6) refers to the same issue as a problem of sampling in that: ". . . accidents of different driver groups may not be similar samples of their total accidents, if the probability of an accident's being reported varies among the groups, or the inclusion criteria are met more frequently by some group's accidents than by others'."
SUMMARY
Those who enter the thicket of road safety literature may find unexpected difficulties of interpretation. Studies with seemingly correct methods at times produce contradictory findings. To help these wanderers in the safety wilderness, this paper tries to shed light on two questions. The first question is which of the many rates that have been proposed for measuring the safety of certain vehicle types of driver groups is to be trusted. We conclude that apples and oranges should not be mixed. For a rate to be correct, the numerator and the denominator must pertain to the same entity.
If vehicle exposure is in the denominator, then the count of vehicles of some type in accidents (and not of accidents involving vehicles of some type) must be in the numerator; if driver exposure is in the denominator then the count of drivers of some kind in accidents (not of accidents involving that kind of driver) must be in the numerator. The second question is what meaning can be attributed to a finding of over-representation. If some type of entity is found over-represented in reported accidents of specified severity, may one conclude that entities of this type are in fact more likely be involved in accidents? Here the answer is 'no', and its root is in the distinction between accidents and reported-accidents-of-specified-severity. If one deals with reported accidents of specified severity (as is always the case), then over-representation may be caused by a mix of three factors: the probability to be in an accident per unit of exposure, the probability of the accidents to be reported, and the probability of the accident to be of the specified severity. O nly if differences in the probability of an accident to be reported and the probability of an accident to be of the specified severity is accounted for (by the Q-ratios) can one get at over-representation due to differences in the likelihood to be in accidents. It follows, that an indication of over-representation cannot be taken to mean that the entity is over-represented in accidents and that one should seek remedies that reduce that chance to be involved in accidents. 
